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The need to contextualize and integrate explanations of politics in an international, trans-
national, and global sense has long been accepted by historians. James E. Casteel’s inves-
tigation of Russia in varying instances of a “German global imaginary” and Christian
Bailey’s transnational study of German “visions of Europe” exemplify two of the most
popular contemporary approaches and their limitations. Although they cover similar pe-
riods, spanning the traditional historical boundaries between the prewar Kaiserreich,
Weimar Republic, National Socialist dictatorship, and the postwar era and founding of
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, the volumes ad-
dress contrasting questions and rely on different types of evidence. Despite the overlap-
ping themes of the two books, there are few indications of how their subject matter might
be connected. Casteel refers to travel accounts, the press, ﬁction, and popular and aca-
demic literature in order not merely to analyze “the important role that Russia played
as an Other in the construction of German national identity and as a force in shaping Ger-
man politics” but also to explore “the changing place of Russia in Germany’s global
imaginary in an age of intensive imperial rivalry”within “an increasingly interconnected
world” (6, 8). The intellectual hinterland of—and practical foil for—the study is a more
or less explicit national paradigm of historical inquiry. By contrast, Bailey’s goal is “to
move away from teleological histories and understandings of European integration,”
such as that of Wilfried Loth, which had—in 1987—sought to deﬁne and bring to life
a particular version of the Continent; namely, that of “Europe as an integrated whole”
(1–2). Bailey’s book seeks to problematize what is often treated as “a linear and solely
post-war process” (2). His transnational account of European history is pitted against a
supranational paradigm of integration.
Casteel’s research follows that of Lev Kopelev’s multivolume project on West-
Östliche Spiegelungen, which examines two-way cultural transfers and relationships be-
tween Russia and Germany, and Gerd Koenen’s Der Russland-Komplex, which rejects
Ernst Nolte’s controversial thesis about a causal nexus between Bolshevism and Nazism
by pointing to the roots of Germany’s putative “Russia complex” in a “long-standing
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image of the ‘Russian peril’” that “morphed into ‘anti-Bolshevism’” (8) after the Russian
Revolution. As a result, the “Nazis did not need to invent an image of Russia from scratch
since they could draw on well-established cultural discourses within German society and
exploit them for their own purposes” (8). Casteel adapts and extends such approaches in
order to examine Russia’s changing role in a global imaginary that was “emerging out of
national formation and imperial competition” (8). Thus, although Russia was situated in
“the East”within Edward Said’s wider schema of “Orientalism,” it was also linked to cul-
tural encounters and informal economic domination in which “cultural representations of
other parts of the world took on a greater signiﬁcance as expressions of power as they
worked to expand the space available for German activity in the world” (9). The coun-
tervailing imperatives and imagery to which this repositioning gave rise served to high-
light the “uncertainty” of the border between Europe and Asia, which made “the con-
struction of Eastern Europe . . . a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion”
(Larry Wolff ) and helped to reinforce the “oscillation between megalomania and angst”
as the “very essence of the myth of Germany’s eastern borderlands” (Gregor Thum, 10).
Casteel’s aim is not to provide a comprehensive survey of German representations of
Russia but to ask “why Russia occupied such a prominent place in German imaginings
of its imperial rival in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (11), placing due emphasis
on continuities across periods characterized by different political regimes. His intention is
to explain how and why “Russia was viewed as Asiatic and Europeanizing, barbaric and
civilizing, backward and modernizing all at the same time” (10).
Such objectives are difﬁcult to achieve. Casteel looks at popular and academic ac-
counts of Russia, summarizing their contents under broad headings (“Siberia” as “Amer-
ica in Asia,” the “rhetoric of colonization,” and depictions of ethnic Germans in the So-
viet Union). Often, the discursive context and relative signiﬁcance of the accounts are
not fully established. This is particularly the case in the ﬁrst two “background” chapters
(out of six in total) about the centuries before 1905. In chapter 3, on Siberia and German
experts on Russia during the late Wilhelmine era, well-known commentators such as
Theodor Schiemann, Otto Hoetzsch, and Paul Rohrbach are introduced alongside more
obscure observers such as Otto Auhagen (“an agricultural expert on Russian Asia for the
German consulate in St Petersburg” [58]), Max Sering (known within the ﬁeld of eco-
nomics but not as a Russian specialist), Otto Goebel (a trade attaché in St. Petersburg
from 1905 to 1910 who published two book-length studies under the auspices of the In-
terior Ministry), Kurt Wiedenfeld (a little-known economist who gained a professorship
at Halle in 1914), Richard Pohle (“a former conservator in the Botanical gardens in
St Petersburg, later a lecturer at the University of Berlin” [78]), and Alfred von Gossler
(head of the military district of Courland during World War I). In chapter 4, on German
travel accounts during the interwar era, the work of the travel writer Colin Ross is inves-
tigated beside that of the Bohemian-born Communist Otto Heller, the conservative Aus-
trian writer Franz Krotsch, the left-wing journalist Otto Corbach, the paciﬁst Arthur
Holitscher, the nationalist publisher Georg Cleinow, the socialist statistician Emil Julius
Gumbel, the sexologist Max Hodann, the Bohemian-born nationalist Hermann Ullmann,
theNazi ideologueAlfredRosenberg, theCommunistwriterFranzJung, theunknowntrav-
eler Walther Allerhand, the conservative publicist Karl Prinz Anton Rohan, the Austrian
socialist and novelist Lili Körber, and the German agricultural attaché Otto Schiller. Such
commentators asked themselves different questions, contributed to separate debates, and
had diverse readerships. As observers of Russia, they were inﬂuenced by other studies of
the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, which they typically sought to deploy in wider
debates about agricultural reform, systems of government, imperial expansion, and so on.
In order to show exactly how, when, and why Russia was a “subject capable of challeng-
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ing the (Western) European order itself ” (174), Casteel would have to provide more detail
and analysis of both sets of discourses and of their interrelationship. The great merit of
this study is its exploration of the patchwork of assumptions about Russia that cut across
temporal and party-political boundaries and contributed to the imagination in the German
public sphere of a “world” in which Germany was located. Its main weakness is that it
spends too little time discussing—if only then to discount—potential divergences be-
tween distinct political milieus, together with shifts brought about by changing political
regimes in Germany and in Russia or the USSR.
Bailey’s approach to Germany’s supposed position in the world is, in some respects, a
mirror image of that of Casteel. Whereas the latter extends an analysis of “othering” and
“Orientalism” to the imagining of world empires in a global setting, the former concen-
trates on networks of policy makers, activists, and closely associated publicists who
were attempting to overcome a history of Continental oppositions and enmity through
European integration as a set of actions—rather than imaginings—and a form of orga-
nization. Bailey aims to show “how integration became an important cause for civil so-
ciety organizations and how it ﬁtted in with their wider intellectual and political pro-
grammes and agendas” (199). Much of the research derives from earlier studies of
transnational networks and groupings of Christian Democrats (Wolfram Kaiser) and of
the internationalism (Rolf Steininger) and exile of Social Democrats (Werner Röder, Lud-
wig Eiber). Yet it also attempts to demonstrate how the European policies of Social and
Christian Democrats shaped domestic policy, “rather than the other way round” (201), and
to investigate how civil society organizations campaigning for European cooperation
produced “widely read journalistic analysis, and helped to revive party political life be-
tween the mid-1920s and the early post-1945 period,” at the same time as cultivating “as-
sociational life between European elites” and developing “an integrationist policy within
socialist and Christian political parties” (199). In these respects, Bailey’s objectives are
close to those of Vanessa Conze in Das Europa der Deutschen: Ideen von Europa in
Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung 1920–1970. Through a fo-
rensic reconstruction of the contacts, interactions, and writings of journalists and politi-
cians connected to the periodical Merkur (and its forerunners the Neue Rundschau and
the Europäische Revue), and to the organizations of Das Demokratische Deutschland
and the Internationaler Sozialististischer Kampfbund, Bailey meets most of these objec-
tives, crafting a careful, original account of the persisting relevance among the parties and
groupings of the center-left and center-right of arguments for a “Third Force” and an in-
tegrated “Central Europe” (Mitteleuropa).
Bailey is arguably less successful—in ways that echo the difﬁculties encountered by
Casteel—in tying the pre- and “post-war trajectories of European federalism” (chap. 6)
and “the rise and fall of a socialist Europe” (chap. 4) to the main debates and policy de-
cisions facing the Social Democratic Party and Christian Democracy. How were region-
alism, particularly that of Bavaria and the German South, and the “Central European”
perspectives of Wilhelm Hoegner, Heinrich Ritzel, Alfred Loritz, Jakob Kindt-Kiefer,
Joseph Wirth, Walter Fliess, and Willi Eichler related to the different priorities of other
Social and Christian Democrats and to wider—and ultimately successful—processes of
Westernization? “German socialists did not lose their commitment to an integrated Europe
that cut across the Cold War divide, even if Kurt Schumacher’s policy has often been re-
garded as more nationalist than pro-European” (137), writes Bailey, but without explaining
fully how the various sets of imperatives intersected. Christian and Social Democrats’mo-
tivations in pursuing European integration were “not always uncomplicatedly nationalist”
(as Alan Milward is held to have suggested in The European Rescue of the Nation-State)
but “could emerge out of long held regional loyalties, particularly in areas such as Bavaria,
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where politicians had sought to mobilize support by highlighting the state’s perceived mar-
ginalization in a united Germany” (193), yet how were security, national interests, and re-
gional loyalties combined? These are questions that Bailey cannot answer, given the peri-
odization and focus of his study, which relies on evidence produced by networks and
organizations strongly in favor of European integration and by advocates of Mitteleuropa
or aGerman-inﬂectedAbendland. It is one of the strengths of his research, however, that it
raises the questions in a stimulating way.
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